Towards the Future: Dynamics of Religion and Politics in Indonesia, and Anticipating Possibilities in the Era of Prabowo-Gibran Administration
Felia Primaresti
Indonesia, as a country where the majority of its population adheres to religion, has created a unique identity often referred to as a “religious state.” Although this term has not been officially defined, it can be understood that this claim refers to the deep influence of religion in various aspects of daily life and within the realm of governance in Indonesia. The existence of religion in this country extends not only to religious practices but also permeates through social norms, government policies, and the overall culture of society. In daily life, religious rituals such as worship, celebrations of religious holidays, and customary ceremonies are integral parts of Indonesian society. However, religion plays a role not only in shaping the value system and morals that form the basis of individual and group behavior in society but also influences state policies and regulations that reflect religious values. For instance, religious symbols are often manifested in national symbols, such as the Pancasila emblem depicting the principle of the belief in one supreme God. Moreover, the abundance of religious institutions and organizations active in various fields of life serves as strong evidence of the role of religion in Indonesia’s social and political structure.
The Significance of Religious Entities in the Indonesian State
In Indonesia, Islam dominates the majority with approximately 87% of the total population, as reported by the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia in 2023. However, the country also encompasses a small number of followers of other religions such as Christianity (7.5%), Catholicism (3%), Hinduism (1.7%), Buddhism (0.7%), and Confucianism (0.05%). The presence of the Muslim majority significantly influences various aspects of life in Indonesia. The dominance of Islam has implications for various aspects of social, cultural, and political life in Indonesia. Norms, traditions, and public policies often reflect the values and teachings of Islam.
In fact, due to the substantial influence of Islam in Indonesia, history records that the relationship between religion and the state has been a complex issue since the early days of Indonesian independence. This debate is primarily related to the role of Islam in the nation’s history, where the majority of Muslims in Indonesia hoped Islam would become the religion and ideology of the state. However, attempts to realize this have repeatedly failed. Both non-Muslims and the majority of Muslims have rejected the idea of Islam as the official religion of the state and the fundamental ideology of the state system (Effendy, 1995).
Moreover, Muslims in Indonesia have also succeeded in creating Islamic community organizations that have significant influence, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, which later played a strong role in shaping various policies and activities in society, including in the political arena. These organizations have also produced influential figures in society, playing crucial roles in practical politics and being involved in the process of public policy-making and state governance. This can be identified as one of the ways or strategies employed by religion and its institutions, in this case, religious organizations, to influence certain political policies and decisions.
The Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI), which is an organization where Islamic scholars in Indonesia gather, is considered to have a significant influence on public policies and societal norms. MUI often issues “fatwas” or religious edicts and recommendations that are later adopted as policies. One example of its fatwa is the prohibition on the use of Israeli products by Indonesian society, which subsequently led to boycott actions. Furthermore, MUI also influences the Indonesian economy by issuing halal certification fatwas, requiring all food and beverage products in Indonesia to have halal labels before being marketed.
Moreover, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), as one of the most influential Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia, has often produced prominent figures who have significant influence in various fields. One such figure is Abdurrahman Wahid, commonly known as Gus Dur, who served as the President of Indonesia from 1999 to 2001. Besides Gus Dur, Ma’ruf Amin, a senior NU cleric and Muslim scholar, currently serves as the Vice President under the leadership of President Joko Widodo from 2019 to 2024. Additionally, Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, who was appointed as the Minister of Religious Affairs of Indonesia in December 2020, is also a prominent NU figure who influences government policies related to religion in Indonesia.
The selection of these NU alumni to join the government is not without reason. According to a study by Hikmah (2020), Ma’ruf Amin was chosen to accompany Joko Widodo not only for his competency but also to mitigate issues related to ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group conflicts (SARA). This indicates that Ma’ruf Amin, as an NU figure, is considered respectable and influential among Indonesian Muslims. This was further affirmed by Romahurmuziy, the Chairman of the United Development Party (PPP), stating that the consideration to choose Ma’ruf Amin as Jokowi’s running mate in 2019 was due to his electability, as he was highly regarded and considered by Indonesian Muslims.
Meanwhile, in the case of Yaqut Cholil Qoumas being appointed by Jokowi as the Minister of Religious Affairs, according to BBC Indonesia (24/12/2020), this was done to dampen the voices of hardline Islamic groups. Yon Machmudi, an Islamic political observer from the University of Indonesia, also shared the same analysis, stating that Jokowi’s reason for choosing Yaqut as Minister of Religious Affairs, amidst many qualified candidates from NU, was to reduce the influence of hardline Islamic groups that had increased in recent years. Based on previous experiences, Yaqut is considered firm and uncompromising towards organizations perceived as “hardline,” such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). Therefore, it is hoped that he can create better political stability.
Within the Muhammadiyah community, several influential figures have emerged who have played significant roles in the history and politics of Indonesia. One of the most notable figures is Amien Rais, often dubbed the “father of reform” due to his crucial role in the reform movement of 1998. Additionally, Amien Rais served as the Chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR RI) from 1999 to 2004. He is also known as one of the founders of the National Mandate Party (PAN), a political party with significant influence in Indonesia, winning 44 seats in the DPR in 2019.
In addition to Amien Rais, the Muhammadiyah group has also produced other influential figures who have played important roles in various aspects of life in Indonesia. One such figure is Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif, affectionately known as Buya Syafi’i. Buya Syafi’i is an intellectual from Muhammadiyah who actively advocates for issues of intolerance and diversity. He is also the founder of the Maarif Institute, an organization that plays a role in education and advocacy to strengthen tolerance and pluralism in Indonesia.
Lastly, there is Din Syamsudin, a Muhammadiyah figure who initiated the Coalition to Save Indonesia (KAMI) movement. This movement emerged in response to various political and social issues in Indonesia, with Din Syamsudin actively criticizing and advocating against government policies deemed controversial. Through the roles of figures such as Amien Rais, Buya Syafi’i, and Din Syamsudin, Muhammadiyah not only serves as a religious organization but also has a significant impact on Indonesia’s political and social dynamics.
The presence of many mass organizations (ormas) that produce influential figures, along with strong and solid follower bases, undoubtedly influences the political dynamics of Indonesia. This can be observed, for example, in the case of the 212 Movement. The 212 Movement refers to the events that took place on December 2, 2016, known as the December 2 Action or the 212 Movement, in Jakarta, Indonesia. Two million people from all over Indonesia gathered to demand the suspension of the Governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), who was facing accusations of blasphemy. This action, also known as the Peaceful Action of December 2 (Republika, 12/3/2016), was coordinated by Habib Rizieq Shihab, who is the chairman of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI).
In the political context, the 212 Movement is believed to be one of the “tools” used to oust Ahok and secure the victory of Anies Baswedan in the electoral contest. It is noteworthy that Anies Baswedan, who ran for Governor of Jakarta at the time, was supported by the Gerindra Party, where Prabowo Subianto was still serving as its chairman. Additionally, the fatwa to hold the 212 Movement first emerged from a fatwa issued by Ma’ruf Amin, who was then the chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) and later elected as Vice President in the 2019 election (Kompas.com, 24/2/2019). Ultimately, this action resulted in Ahok’s imprisonment and the victory of Anies Baswedan and his running mate at the time, Sandiaga Uno, in the Jakarta gubernatorial election.
This phenomenon has become a significant symbol indicating that the mobilization of masses has a strong influence on political dynamics in Indonesia. This strategy has been widely used in other contexts as well, such as influencing the process of building minority religious places of worship in Indonesia. Referring to a qualitative study conducted by The Indonesian Institute, Center for Public Policy Research (TII) from November 2023 to February 2024, it is explained that Islamic mass organizations play a central role in opposing the construction of places of worship in Indonesia. This often results in majority bias and is prone to politicization.
One of the most phenomenal cases of rejection of places of worship in Indonesia occurred at the Indonesian Christian Church (GKI) Yasmin in Bogor City. The construction of this church was delayed for fifteen years before it was finally inaugurated because the Building Permit (IMB) held by the management was revoked by the local government under pressure from intolerant mass organizations (Tempo, 23/4/2023). This serves as justification that, once again, mass organizations play a significant role in influencing decision-making processes in Indonesia.
Furthermore, from these central mass organizations, political parties have emerged, often based on the same ideological foundations and mass support. According to historical records, the presence of Islamic parties was restricted during the era of Soeharto’s rule through policies of party merger and the single principle which required mass organizations and political parties to be based on the Pancasila ideology without any other ideological elements.
Significant changes occurred after the reform era, especially during the administration of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur). Gus Dur’s administration provided a fresh perspective on the agenda of religious freedom, including the establishment of religious political parties. Bold steps taken, such as the repeal of restrictions on freedom of assembly, association, and the formation of political parties based on Islamic ideology, opened up a more inclusive and democratic political space for religious groups in Indonesia.
From there, various Islamic parties emerged that played significant roles in Indonesian politics post-reform. It is also important to note that these parties are not separate from mass organizations in Indonesia. The National Awakening Party (PKB), the United Development Party (PPP), the Justice Party (PK), and the National Mandate Party (PAN) are some of them. However, it should be noted that, during Gus Dur’s administration, Islamic parties did not fully display their Islamic identity consistently. Most of them claimed to be Islamic nationalist parties that still upheld Pancasila as their main ideological foundation, although the level of adherence to Islamic aspects varied among them.
Parties such as PKB and PAN prefer an inclusive approach to interpreting religion. They identify themselves as open parties that provide space for various segments of society, regardless of their religious backgrounds. On the other hand, other Islamic parties like PK and PPP adopt an exclusive approach by emphasizing Islam, particularly the Quran and Hadith, as the main foundation of their party. They tend to put their religious identity at the forefront of their political platforms and often emphasize religious agendas in their campaigns and political policies.
Interreligious Relations in Indonesia
Despite the strong dominance of Islam in Indonesia, the presence of other religions such as Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism also significantly influences the life of this nation. In addition to the roles mentioned earlier in the fields of economy, education, and politics, the role of religion and its institutions extends to broader social realms. For instance, they provide marriage counseling services, psychological guidance, assistance centers for victims of violence and sexual abuse, and participate in handling disease outbreaks and natural disasters. Moreover, they are also involved in environmental affairs, facing climate challenges, and advocating for environmental conservation. In this context, religious diversity in Indonesia not only serves as a spiritual foundation for society but also constitutes an important pillar in building an inclusive and sustainable national life.
It is worth noting that despite Islam’s dominance in Indonesia, followed by other religions such as Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, there still exist small groups adhering to local beliefs. Although their numbers are relatively small compared to followers of other religions, their role remains significant, particularly in the context of climate crisis management, cultural preservation, and contribution to the local economy (Paris Peace Forum, 2023).
Drawing from various religious backgrounds, the dynamics of Indonesian society are quite intriguing. Collaboration is often undertaken to address specific issues. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia, the Indonesian Tzu Chi Foundation donated rapid tests and 50 thousand masks for COVID-19 emergency response aid (Kompas.com, 10/23/2020). This donation was then distributed to the Jakarta Health Agency as the region had a high rate of COVID-19 transmission.
Moreover, other religious organizations such as the Pangudi Luhur Foundation, Muhammadiyah, and BPK Penabur (Republika, 11/10/2020) also contributed by distributing masks to street users who could not work from home and raising funds to provide Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for medical personnel at the forefront of COVID-19 management. Additionally, humanitarian activities were carried out by providing free meals to motorcycle taxi drivers, both online and offline, who had to leave their homes to earn a living despite violating government recommendations.
In addition to their role in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, collaboration among religious communities in Indonesia also occurs in efforts to address environmental issues. An initiative called Gema Bhinneka launched by Muhammadiyah in collaboration with an international consortium representing various religions, namely the Joint Initiative for Strategic Religious Affairs (Jisra). As reported by Kompas.com on June 10, 2023, this initiative aims to address environmental issues by involving communities from various religious backgrounds. According to Hening Parlan, the Director of the Eco Bhinneka program, the goal of this program is to strengthen awareness of the importance of environmental conservation and involve active contributions from various religious communities in this effort.
Although interfaith relations in Indonesia are relatively harmonious, conflicts that color these dynamics often arise. Over the past decade and a half, longitudinal data compiled by the SETARA Institute (2007-2022) show 573 incidents disrupting worship and places of worship. These incidents include the dissolution and rejection of worship, rejection of places of worship, intimidation, vandalism, arson, and so on. All of these incidents occurred among minority groups, both in relation to external parties and within the religious communities themselves.
This data is supported by findings from a qualitative study conducted by The Indonesian Institute (2024), which revealed that conflicts over the construction of places of worship in Indonesia are caused by various factors. These factors include the lack of appropriate legal frameworks to address these issues, the lack of policymaker capacity to resolve conflicts, and inappropriate personal approaches and sentiments both among religious communities and among different religious denominations.
From the above exposition, it can be concluded that the religious and belief diversity in Indonesia not only serves as a spiritual foundation for society but also constitutes an important pillar in building an inclusive and sustainable national life. Although there are challenges such as interfaith conflicts, collaborative efforts and cooperation among religions also occur in addressing various issues, ranging from health crises like the COVID-19 pandemic to environmental issues. By strengthening cooperation and dialogue among religions, it is hoped that Indonesia can continue to move towards a more tolerant, harmonious, and prosperous society for all its citizens without exception.
Religion and Politics in the New Indonesian Government
Following the 2024 election results that solidified Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming as the winners (KPU, 2024), new hopes, expectations, as well as potential positive and negative implications toward the direction of policies to be undertaken by this new government arise, including in the realm of religious policies. Before delving further into the potential of this under the new Prabowo-Gibran administration, it is interesting to note that prior to Prabowo, Indonesia has had leaders with military backgrounds twice before. This occurred during the Soeharto Administration (1966-1998) and the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) Administration (2004-2014).
The Soeharto government tended to be more repressive toward religious freedom, as evidenced by party fusion policies and the single principle that limited parties and groups with religious bases. During SBY’s tenure, many institutions assessed that radicalism actually worsened (Kompas.com. 31/3/2015). However, some also viewed it as a form of freedom of expression.
In the context of Prabowo, he clearly has historical ties to conservative Islamic groups. This can be identified from his involvement in the 212 Movement indirectly, because Gerindra Party at the time supported Anies Baswedan’s victory in the 2016 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election. Furthermore, in the 2019 election, Prabowo was also supported by many ‘radical’ Islamic groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and the National Movement to Safeguard Fatwas (GNPF).
However, it is important to remember that Indonesian politics is not monolithic. The complex political dynamics and societal diversity make changes in attitudes and political directions commonplace. This can be seen, for example, from Prabowo’s shifting stance during the second term of the Jokowi Administration in 2019, when he was appointed as Minister of Defense. This decision certainly sparked waves of disappointment from his supporters such as GNFP and FPI. However, on the other hand, it also demonstrates that political pragmatism can significantly alter political alliances.
In the context of the 2024 election, Prabowo appears to have adopted a more moderate and nationalist style, with support from political parties and volunteer groups that are more diverse such as the Golkar Party, the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), and ProJo (Pro Jokowi), a volunteer group known for supporting Jokowi in the 2019 election. This indicates the potential for changes in his political approach to religious issues. Despite having a support base from various backgrounds, including conservative groups, in this regard, Prabowo also appears to be trying to strengthen support from more moderate segments of society.
This can be seen, for example, in the 17 Priorities of Prabowo-Gibran in the 2024 Election. In point 16, it is written that one of the priority programs of Prabowo-Gibran is to ensure harmony among religious communities, freedom of worship, and the establishment and maintenance of places of worship. This at least indicates an awareness of the importance of maintaining interreligious harmony. Thus, through these campaign promises, a glimpse of the future direction of Prabowo’s policies can be discerned, wherein he ensures the freedom to express religion and belief.
However, despite indications of a shift toward a more inclusive approach to religious policy, the reality of complex governance and pressure from various quarters can influence the implementation of such policies. Moreover, the composition and campaign style of the Prabowo-Gibran National Campaign Team (TKN) still often exploit populism and narratives with religious undertones that have the potential to provoke future conflicts. This can be seen, for example, through the speech of Zulkifli Hasan, Minister of Trade and member of the Prabowo Gibran TKN, who made jokes about the prayer movement (Detik.com, 19/12/2024).
Additionally, Prabowo-Gibran’s campaign in 2024 is also characterized by the involvement of prominent Islamic clerics. A lineup of well-known Islamic clerics adorns Prabowo-Gibran’s campaign team, ranging from Miftah Maulana Habiburrahman, known as Gus Miftah, KH Abdul Ghofur, Habib Umar Assegaf to Habib Ahmad bin Hasan Alaydrus.
It means that the inclusivity expected through the campaign promises of Prabowo-Gibran, especially regarding tolerance and the construction of places of worship, may not be fulfilled. This argument refers to the findings of a qualitative study by The Indonesian Institute (2024), which noted that the prevalence of intolerance and rejection of the construction of places of worship is partly due to the arrogance of the majority and the desire for power.
It is also important to note that the victory of Prabowo-Gibran cannot be separated from the strong endorsement of Jokowi. This indicates that the future government may not change significantly in its nature and character, including its religious policy, due to Jokowi’s strong influence in the Prabowo-Gibran administration. Many of Jokowi’s ministers openly supported Prabowo-Gibran during the campaign period, such as Airlangga Hartarto, Zulkifli Hasan, and Bahlill Lahadalia. Therefore, it is possible that the same individuals from the Jokowi administration will return to the Prabowo-Gibran administration.
Real challenges will undoubtedly arise in achieving a balance between religious freedom and maintaining social harmony, especially amid the dynamics of political coalitions coupled with increasing religious intolerance. Therefore, although the victory of Prabowo-Gibran has the potential to bring about positive transformation in the management of religious policies, there is still a need to closely monitor the government’s actions in line with these commitments. Concrete steps to ensure inclusivity and respect for religious diversity in Indonesia will be one of the benchmarks for their government’s success.